Search the web
Welcome, Guest
[Sign Out, My Account]
EDGAR_Online

Quotes & Info
Enter Symbol(s):
e.g. YHOO, ^DJI
Symbol Lookup | Financial Search
MTG > SEC Filings for MTG > Form 10-Q on 8-Aug-2014All Recent SEC Filings

Show all filings for MGIC INVESTMENT CORP

Form 10-Q for MGIC INVESTMENT CORP


8-Aug-2014

Quarterly Report


Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations

Overview

Through our subsidiaries MGIC and MIC, we are a leading provider of private mortgage insurance in the United States, as measured by insurance in force, to the home mortgage lending industry.

As used below, "we" and "our" refer to MGIC Investment Corporation's consolidated operations. The discussion below should be read in conjunction with "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2013. We refer to this Discussion as the "10-K MD&A." In the discussion below, we classify, in accordance with industry practice, as "full documentation" loans approved by GSE and other automated underwriting systems under "doc waiver" programs that do not require verification of borrower income. For additional information about such loans, see footnote (3) to the composition of primary default inventory table under "Results of Consolidated Operations-Losses-Losses incurred" below. The discussion of our business in this document generally does not apply to our Australian operations which have historically been immaterial. The results of our operations in Australia are included in the consolidated results disclosed. For additional information about our Australian operations, see our risk factor titled "Our Australian operations may suffer significant losses" and "Overview-Australia" in our 10-K MD&A.

Forward Looking and Other Statements

As discussed under "Forward Looking Statements and Risk Factors" below, actual results may differ materially from the results contemplated by forward looking statements. We are not undertaking any obligation to update any forward looking statements or other statements we may make in the following discussion or elsewhere in this document even though these statements may be affected by events or circumstances occurring after the forward looking statements or other statements were made. Therefore no reader of this document should rely on these statements being current as of any time other than the time at which this document was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Outlook

Since 2008, substantially all of the loans we insured have been sold to the GSEs, which have been in conservatorship since late 2008. When the conservatorship will end and what role, if any, the GSEs will play in the secondary mortgage market post-conservatorship will be determined by Congress. The scope of the Federal Housing Administration's (the "FHA") large market presence may also change in connection with the determination of the future of the GSEs. Capital standards for private mortgage insurers are being revised; see "Capital" below. There are also pending regulatory changes that could affect demand for private mortgage insurance; see our risk factor titled "The amount of insurance we write could be adversely affected if the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgage results in a reduced number of low down payment loans available to be insured or if lenders and investors select alternatives to private mortgage insurance." While we strongly believe private mortgage insurance should be an integral part of credit enhancement in a future mortgage market, its role in that market cannot be predicted.


Capital

GSEs

As mentioned above, since 2008, substantially all of our insurance written has been for loans sold to the GSEs, each of which has mortgage insurer eligibility requirements. The existing eligibility requirements include a minimum financial strength rating of Aa3/AA-. Because MGIC does not meet such financial strength rating requirements (its financial strength rating from Moody's is Ba3 (with a stable outlook) and from Standard & Poor's is BB (with a positive outlook)), MGIC is currently operating with each GSE as an eligible insurer under a remediation plan.

On July 10, 2014, the conservator of the GSEs, the Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA"), released draft Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements ("draft PMIERs"). The FHFA has requested public input on the draft PMIERs by September 8, 2014. The draft PMIERs include revised financial requirements for mortgage insurers (the "GSE Financial Requirements") that require a mortgage insurer's "Available Assets" (generally only the most liquid assets of an insurer) to meet or exceed "Minimum Required Assets" (which are calculated from tables of factors with several risk dimensions and are subject to a floor amount).

The PMIERs will become effective 180 days after the date they are published in final form (the "publication date"). Mortgage insurers would have up to two years after the publication date to meet the GSE Financial Requirements (the "transition period"). During the transition period, a mortgage insurer that fails to meet the GSE Financial Requirements would be subject to a transition plan having milestones for actions to achieve compliance. The transition plan would be submitted for the approval of each GSE within 90 days after the effective date, and if approved, the GSEs would monitor the insurer's progress. During the transition period for an insurer with an approved transition plan, an insurer would be in remediation (a status similar to the one under which MGIC has been operating with the GSEs for over five years) and eligible to provide mortgage insurance on loans owned or guaranteed by the GSEs.

Although we believe we have sufficient claims paying resources to meet our claim obligations on our insurance in force on a timely basis, we estimate that if the draft PMIERs are implemented as released, as of December 31, 2014 (the expected publication date), MGIC would have a shortfall in Available Assets of approximately $600 million, with Available Assets of approximately $5.3 billion and Minimum Required Assets of approximately $5.9 billion. We believe this shortfall would be reduced through operations so that as of December 31, 2016 (the expected end of the transition period), it would be approximately $300 million. The shortfall projections at both dates assume the risk in force and capital of MIC are repatriated to MGIC, and full credit is given in the calculation of Minimum Required Assets for our existing reinsurance transaction (approximately $500 million of credit at December 31, 2014, increasing to $600 million of credit at December 31, 2016). However, we do not expect to receive full credit for our current reinsurance transaction. As a result, we have begun discussions with the reinsurance market to modify our existing reinsurance transaction so that any reduction in the credit would be minimized.


As of June 30, 2014, we had approximately $515 million of cash and investments at our holding company, a portion of which we believe may be available for future contribution to MGIC. Furthermore, there are regulated insurance affiliates of MGIC that have approximately $100 million of assets as of June 30, 2014. We expect that, subject to regulatory approval, we would be able to use a material portion of these assets to increase the Available Assets of MGIC. Additionally, if the draft PMIERs are implemented as released, we would consider seeking additional reinsurance and/or non-dilutive debt capital to mitigate the shortfall. We believe we will be able to use a combination of the alternatives outlined above so that MGIC would meet the GSE Financial Requirements of the draft PMIERs even if they are implemented as released. However, there can be no assurance that MGIC will be in compliance with the GSE Financial Requirements within the transition period. Factors that may impact MGIC's compliance with the GSE Financial Requirements include the following:

Changes in the actual PMIERs adopted from the draft PMIERs may increase the amount of the MGIC's Minimum Required Assets or reduce its Available Assets, with the result that the shortfall in Available Assets could increase;

We may not obtain regulatory approval to transfer assets from MGIC's regulated insurance affiliates to the extent we are assuming because regulators project higher losses than we project or require a level of capital be maintained in these companies higher than we are assuming;

We may not be able to access the non-dilutive debt markets due to market conditions, concern about our creditworthiness, or other factors, in a manner sufficient to provide the funds we are assuming;

We may not be able to achieve modifications in our existing reinsurance arrangements necessary to minimize the reduction in the credit for reinsurance under the draft PMIERs; and

We may not be able to obtain additional reinsurance necessary to further reduce the Minimum Required Assets due to market capacity, pricing or other reasons.

You should read our risk factors for information about matters that also could negatively affect MGIC's compliance with the GSE Financial Requirements. Such matters could decrease our revenues, increase our losses or require the use of assets, thereby reducing our Available Assets and increasing our shortfall in Available Assets, or they could increase the Minimum Required Assets, also increasing our shortfall in Available Assets.

There also can be no assurance that the GSEs would not make the GSE Financial Requirements more onerous in the future; in this regard, the draft PMIERs provide that the tables of factors that determine Minimum Required Assets may be updated to reflect changes in risk characteristics and the macroeconomic environment. If MGIC ceases to be eligible to insure loans purchased by one or both of the GSEs, it would significantly reduce the volume of our new business writings.

If we increase the amount of Available Assets we hold in order to continue to insure GSE loans, the amount of capital we hold may increase. If we increase the amount of capital we hold with respect to insured loans, our returns may decrease unless we increase premiums. An increase in premium rates may not be feasible for a number of reasons, including competition from other private mortgage insurers, the FHA or other credit enhancement products.

State Regulations

The insurance laws of 16 jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, our domiciliary state, require a mortgage insurer to maintain a minimum amount of statutory capital relative to the risk in force (or a similar measure) in order for the mortgage insurer to continue to write new business. We refer to these requirements as the "State Capital Requirements" and, together with the GSE Financial Requirements, the "Financial Requirements." While they vary among jurisdictions, the most common State Capital Requirements allow for a maximum risk-to-capital ratio of 25 to 1. A risk-to-capital ratio will increase if (i) the percentage decrease in capital exceeds the percentage decrease in insured risk, or (ii) the percentage increase in capital is less than the percentage increase in insured risk. Wisconsin does not regulate capital by using a risk-to-capital measure but instead requires a minimum policyholder position ("MPP"). The "policyholder position" of a mortgage insurer is its net worth or surplus, contingency reserve and a portion of the reserves for unearned premiums.


In 2013, we entered into a quota share reinsurance transaction with a group of unaffiliated reinsurers that reduced our risk-to-capital ratio. At June 30, 2014, MGIC's risk-to-capital ratio was 15.2 to 1, below the maximum allowed by the jurisdictions with State Capital Requirements, and its policyholder position was $555 million above the required MPP of $1.0 billion. It is possible that under the revised State Capital Requirements discussed below, MGIC will not be allowed full credit for the risk ceded to the reinsurers. If MGIC is disallowed full credit under either the State Capital Requirements or the GSE Financial Requirements, MGIC may terminate the transaction, without penalty, when such disallowance becomes effective. At this time, we expect MGIC to continue to comply with the current State Capital Requirements, although we cannot assure you of such compliance.

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") previously announced that it plans to revise the minimum capital and surplus requirements for mortgage insurers that are provided for in its Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Model Act. A working group of state regulators is considering this issue, although no date has been established by which the NAIC must propose revisions to such requirements. Depending on the scope of revisions made by the NAIC, MGIC may be prevented from writing new business in the jurisdictions adopting such revisions.

Qualified Residential Mortgages

The financial reform legislation that was passed in July 2010 (the "Dodd-Frank Act" or "Dodd-Frank") requires lenders to consider a borrower's ability to repay a home loan before extending credit. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") rule defining "Qualified Mortgage" ("QM") for purposes of implementing the "ability to repay" law became effective in January 2014. There is a temporary category of QMs for mortgages that satisfy the general product feature requirements of QMs and meet the GSEs' underwriting requirements (the "temporary category"). The temporary category will phase out when the GSEs' conservatorship ends, or if sooner, after seven years. In May 2013, the FHFA directed the GSEs to limit their mortgage acquisitions to loans that meet the requirements of a QM under the ability to repay rule, including those that meet the temporary category, and loans that are exempt from the "ability to repay" requirements. We may insure loans that do not qualify as QMs, however, we are unsure the extent to which lenders will make non-QM loans because they will not be entitled to the presumptions about compliance with the "ability to repay" requirements that the law allows lenders with respect to QM loans. We are also unsure the extent to which lenders will purchase private mortgage insurance for loans that cannot be sold to the GSEs.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") definition of QM that applies to loans insured by the FHA became effective in January 2014. HUD's QM definition is less restrictive than the CFPB's definition in certain respects, including that (i) it has no limit on the debt-to-income ratio of a borrower, and (ii) it allows the lender certain presumptions about compliance with the "ability to repay" requirements on higher priced loans. It is possible that lenders will prefer FHA-insured loans to loans insured by private mortgage insurance as a result of the FHA's less restrictive QM definition.


Given the credit characteristics presented to us, we estimate that approximately 87% of our new risk written in 2013 and 84% of our new risk written in the first half of 2014 was for loans that would have met the CFPB's general QM definition. We estimate that approximately 99% of our new risk written in 2013 and in the first half of 2014 was for loans that would have met the CFPB's QM definition, when giving effect to the temporary category. In making these estimates, we have not considered the limitation on points and fees because the information is not available to us. We do not believe such limitation would materially affect the percentage of our new risk written meeting the QM definitions.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires a securitizer to retain at least 5% of the risk associated with mortgage loans that are securitized, and in some cases the retained risk may be allocated between the securitizer and the lender that originated the loan. This risk retention requirement does not apply to mortgage loans that are Qualified Residential Mortgages ("QRMs") or that are insured by the FHA or another federal agency. In 2011, federal regulators released a proposed risk retention rule that included a definition of QRM. In response to public comments regarding the proposed rule, federal regulators issued a revised proposed rule in August 2013. The revised proposed rule generally defines QRM as a mortgage meeting the requirements of a QM. The regulators also proposed an alternative QRM definition ("QM-plus") which utilizes certain QM criteria but also includes a maximum loan-to-value ratio ("LTV") of 70%. Neither of the revised definitions of QRM considers the use of mortgage insurance for purposes of calculating LTV. While substantially all of our new risk written in 2013 and in the first half of 2014 was on loans that met the QM definition (and, therefore, the proposed general QRM definition), none of our new insurance written met the QM-plus definition. The public comment period for the revised proposed rule expired on October 30, 2013. The final timing of the adoption of any risk retention regulation and the definition of QRM remains uncertain. Because of the capital support provided by the U.S. Government, the GSEs satisfy the Dodd-Frank risk-retention requirements while they are in conservatorship. Therefore, lenders that originate loans that are sold to the GSEs while they are in conservatorship would not be required to retain risk associated with those loans.

The amount of new insurance that we write may be materially adversely affected depending on, among other things, (a) the final definition of QRM and its LTV requirements and (b) whether lenders choose mortgage insurance for non-QRM loans. In addition, changes in the final regulations regarding treatment of GSE-guaranteed mortgage loans, or changes in the conservatorship or capital support provided to the GSEs by the U.S. Government, could impact the manner in which the risk-retention rules apply to GSE securitizations, originators who sell loans to GSEs and our business. For other factors that could decrease the demand for mortgage insurance, see our risk factor titled "If the volume of low down payment home mortgage originations declines, the amount of insurance that we write could decline, which would reduce our revenues."

GSE Reform

The FHFA is the conservator of the GSEs and has the authority to control and direct their operations. The increased role that the federal government has assumed in the residential mortgage market through the GSE conservatorship may increase the likelihood that the business practices of the GSEs change in ways that have a material adverse effect on us. In addition, these factors may increase the likelihood that the charters of the GSEs are changed by new federal legislation. The Dodd-Frank Act required the U.S. Department of the Treasury to report its recommendations regarding options for ending the conservatorship of the GSEs. This report was released in February 2011 and while it does not provide any definitive timeline for GSE reform, it does recommend using a combination of federal housing policy changes to wind down the GSEs, shrink the government's footprint in housing finance (including FHA insurance), and help bring private capital back to the mortgage market. Since then, Members of Congress introduced several bills intended to change the business practices of the GSEs and the FHA; however, no legislation has been enacted. As a result of the matters referred to above, it is uncertain what role the GSEs, FHA and private capital, including private mortgage insurance, will play in the domestic residential housing finance system in the future or the impact of any such changes on our business. In addition, the timing of the impact of any resulting changes on our business is uncertain. Most meaningful changes would require Congressional action to implement and it is difficult to estimate when Congressional action would be final and how long any associated phase-in period may last.


For additional information about the business practices of the GSEs, see our risk factor titled "Changes in the business practices of the GSEs, federal legislation that changes their charters or a restructuring of the GSEs could reduce our revenues or increase our losses."

Loan Modification and Other Similar Programs

Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008, the federal government, including through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the GSEs, and several lenders implemented programs to modify loans to make them more affordable to borrowers with the goal of reducing the number of foreclosures. During 2012, 2013 and the first half of 2014, we were notified of modifications that cured delinquencies that had they become paid claims would have resulted in approximately $1.2 billion, $1.0 billion and $420 million, respectively, of estimated claim payments. As noted below, we cannot predict with a high degree of confidence what the ultimate re-default rate on these modifications will be. Although the recent re-default rate has been lower, for internal reporting and planning purposes, we assume approximately 50% of these modifications will ultimately re-default, and those re-defaults may result in future claim payments. Because modifications cure the defaults with respect to the previously defaulted loans, our loss reserves do not account for potential re-defaults unless at the time the reserve is established, the re-default has already occurred. Based on information that is provided to us, most of the modifications resulted in reduced payments from interest rate and/or amortization period adjustments; from 2012 through the first half of 2014, approximately 9% resulted in principal forgiveness.

One loan modification program is the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP") which began in 2009. We believe that it could take several months from the time a borrower has made all of the payments during HAMP's three month "trial modification" period for the loan to be reported to us as a cured delinquency. We rely on information provided to us by the GSEs and servicers. We do not receive all of the information from such sources that is required to determine with certainty the number of loans that are participating in, have successfully completed, or are eligible to participate in, HAMP. We are aware of approximately 6,270 loans in our primary delinquent inventory at June 30, 2014 for which the HAMP trial period has begun and which trial periods have not been reported to us as completed or cancelled. Through June 30, 2014, approximately 53,700 delinquent primary loans have cured their delinquency after entering HAMP and are not in default. In 2013 and the first half of 2014, approximately 17% and 16%, respectively, of our primary cures were the result of a modification, with HAMP accounting for approximately 68% of those modifications in each of 2013 and the first half of 2014. Although the HAMP program has been extended through December 2016, we believe that we have realized the majority of the benefits from HAMP because the number of loans insured by us that we are aware are entering HAMP trial modification periods has decreased significantly since 2010. The interest rates on certain loans modified under HAMP are subject to adjustment five years after the modification was entered into. Such adjustments are limited to an increase of one percentage point per year.


In 2009, the GSEs began offering the Home Affordable Refinance Program ("HARP"). HARP, which has been extended through December 2015, allows borrowers who are not delinquent but who may not otherwise be able to refinance their loans under the current GSE underwriting standards, to refinance their loans. We allow HARP refinances on loans that we insure, regardless of whether the loan meets our current underwriting standards, and we account for the refinance as a loan modification (even where there is a new lender) rather than new insurance written. Approximately 16% of our primary insurance in force has benefitted from HARP and is still in force.

The effect on us of loan modifications depends on how many modified loans subsequently re-default, which in turn can be affected by changes in housing values. Re-defaults can result in losses for us that could be greater than we would have paid had the loan not been modified. At this point, we cannot predict with a high degree of confidence what the ultimate re-default rate will be. Eligibility under certain loan modification programs can also adversely affect us by creating an incentive for borrowers who are able to make their mortgage payments to become delinquent in an attempt to obtain the benefits of a modification. New notices of delinquency increase our incurred losses. If legislation is enacted to permit a portion of a borrower's mortgage loan balance to be reduced in bankruptcy and if the borrower re-defaults after such reduction, then the amount we would be responsible to cover would be calculated after adding back the reduction. Unless a lender has obtained our prior approval, if a borrower's mortgage loan balance is reduced outside the bankruptcy context, including in association with a loan modification, and if the borrower re-defaults after such reduction, then under the terms of our policy the amount we would be responsible to cover would be calculated net of the reduction.

As shown in the following table, as of June 30, 2014 approximately 27% of our primary risk in force has been modified.

                       HARP (1)              HAMP                Other
  Policy Year        Modifications       Modifications       Modifications
2003 and Prior                  9.3 %              11.3 %              11.2 %
     2004                      14.3 %              11.3 %               9.7 %
     2005                      19.0 %              13.2 %              10.3 %
     2006                      22.5 %              15.5 %              11.1 %
     2007                      31.7 %              16.4 %               7.0 %
     2008                      45.5 %               9.7 %               3.3 %
     2009                      18.0 %               0.7 %               0.5 %
2010 - Q2 2014                  0.0 %               0.0 %               0.0 %

     Total                     15.5 %               7.3 %               4.3 %

(1) Includes proprietary programs that are substantially the same as HARP

As of June 30, 2014 based on loan count, the loans associated with 98.5% of all HARP (or similar) modifications, 77.9% of HAMP modifications and 69.9% of other modifications were current.

Over the past several years, the average time it takes to receive a claim associated with a defaulted loan has increased. This is, in part, due to new loss mitigation protocols established by servicers and to changes in some state foreclosure laws that may include, for example, a requirement for additional review and/or mediation processes. Unless a loan is cured during a foreclosure delay, at the completion of the foreclosure, additional interest and expenses may be due to the lender from the borrower. In some circumstances, our paid claim amount may include some additional interest and expenses.


Factors Affecting Our Results

Our results of operations are affected by:

Premiums written and earned

Premiums written and earned in a year are influenced by:

New insurance written, which increases insurance in force, and is the aggregate principal amount of the mortgages that are insured during a period. Many factors affect new insurance written, including the volume of low down payment home mortgage originations and competition to provide credit enhancement on those mortgages, including competition from the FHA, other mortgage insurers, . . .

  Add MTG to Portfolio     Set Alert         Email to a Friend  
Get SEC Filings for Another Symbol: Symbol Lookup
Quotes & Info for MTG - All Recent SEC Filings
Copyright © 2014 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved. Privacy Policy - Terms of Service
SEC Filing data and information provided by EDGAR Online, Inc. (1-800-416-6651). All information provided "as is" for informational purposes only, not intended for trading purposes or advice. Neither Yahoo! nor any of independent providers is liable for any informational errors, incompleteness, or delays, or for any actions taken in reliance on information contained herein. By accessing the Yahoo! site, you agree not to redistribute the information found therein.