The following discussion of our financial condition and results of operations should be read in conjunction with our financial statements and related notes included elsewhere in this report.

Overview

We are an externally-managed mortgage REIT incorporated in Maryland in September 2007 to invest in single-family residential mortgage pass-through securities guaranteed or issued by a U.S. Government agency (such as Ginnie Mae), or by a U.S. Government-sponsored entity (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Our principal goal is to generate net income for distribution to our shareholders through regular quarterly dividends and protect and grow our shareholders' equity (which we also refer to as our "book value") through prudent interest rate risk management. Our net income is determined primarily by the difference between the interest income we earn on our agency securities net of premium or discount amortization and the cost of our borrowings and hedging activities, which we also refer to as our net interest spread or net interest margin. We utilize substantial borrowings in financing our investment portfolio, which can enhance potential returns but exacerbate losses. In general, our book value is most affected by our issuance of shares of our common stock, our retained earnings or losses, and changes in the value of our investment portfolio and our hedging instruments.

In order to grow our company, we may from time to time raise additional capital using various market based transactions. Accordingly, all of our financial results and data should be viewed with the knowledge that our equity raises have been significant for our company, and that some period to period comparisons may not be meaningful or may produce comparisons that may be misleading to future activity and results.

The following table represents key data regarding our company since the quarter ending March 31, 2010:

(in thousands except per share amounts)                                                                                                   Quarterly Weighted
                                                                  Repurchase                           Shares           Book Value         Average Earnings
As of                               Agency Securities  (1)        Agreements         Equity          Outstanding        Per Share             Per Share
December 31, 2012                   $            24,648,140      $ 22,866,429      $ 3,072,864             98,822      $      28.19      $               1.02
September 30, 2012                  $            27,931,504      $ 23,583,180      $ 3,212,556             98,809      $      29.60      $               0.83
June 30, 2012                       $            24,535,118      $ 20,152,860      $ 2,692,261             98,074      $      27.45      $               0.91
March 31, 2012                      $            22,562,895      $ 16,556,630      $ 2,669,300             97,779      $      27.30      $               0.89
December 31, 2011                   $            18,146,767      $ 16,162,375      $ 2,080,188             76,823      $      27.08      $               0.92
September 30, 2011                  $            19,014,997      $ 15,886,231      $ 2,015,003             76,547      $      26.32      $               1.04
June 30, 2011                       $            16,678,511      $ 14,800,594      $ 2,006,606             75,092      $      26.72      $               1.04
March 31, 2011                      $            14,811,137      $ 11,495,749      $ 1,894,540             72,572      $      26.11      $               0.96
December 31, 2010                   $            10,418,764      $  8,681,060      $ 1,145,484             46,116      $      24.84      $               0.99
September 30, 2010                  $             9,581,916      $  6,678,426      $ 1,190,313             46,085      $      25.83      $               1.12
June 30, 2010                       $             7,651,266      $  5,982,998      $   965,619             37,388      $      25.83      $               1.01
March 31, 2010                      $             7,125,065      $  6,102,661      $   929,433             36,472      $      25.48      $               1.21

(1) Includes unsettled purchases and forward commitments to purchase agency securities.

Factors that Affect our Results of Operations and Financial Condition

Our results of operations and financial condition are affected by various factors, many of which are beyond our control, including, among other things, our net interest income, the market value of our assets and the supply of and demand for such assets. We invest in financial assets and markets, and recent events, including those discussed below, can affect our business in ways that are difficult to predict, and produce results outside of typical operating variances. Our net interest income varies primarily as a result of changes in interest rates, borrowing costs and prepayment speeds, the behavior of which involves various risks and uncertainties. Prepayment rates, as reflected by the rate of principal paydown, and interest rates vary according to the type of investment, conditions in financial markets, government actions, competition and other factors, none of which can be predicted with any certainty. In general, as prepayment rates on our agency securities purchased at a premium increase, related purchase premium amortization increases, thereby reducing the net yield on such assets. Because changes in interest rates may significantly affect our activities, our operating results depend, in large part, upon our ability to manage interest rate risks and prepayment risks effectively while maintaining our status as a REIT.

We anticipate that, for any period during which changes in the interest rates earned on our assets do not coincide with interest rate changes on our borrowings, such asset coupon rates will reprice more slowly than the corresponding liabilities used to finance those assets. Consequently, changes in interest rates, particularly short-term interest rates, may significantly influence our net interest income. With the maturities of our assets generally being longer term than those of our liabilities, interest rate increases will tend to decrease our net interest income and the market value of our assets (and therefore our book value). Such rate increases could possibly result in operating losses or adversely affect our ability to make distributions to our shareholders.

Prepayments on agency securities and the underlying mortgage loans may be influenced by changes in market interest rates and a variety of economic, geographic and other factors beyond our control; and consequently such prepayment rates cannot be predicted with certainty. To the extent we have acquired agency securities at a premium or discount to par, or face value, changes in prepayment rates may impact our anticipated yield. In periods of declining interest rates, prepayments on our agency securities will likely increase. If we are unable to reinvest the proceeds of these prepayments at comparable yields, our net interest income may suffer. The current climate of government intervention in the mortgage market significantly increases the risk associated with prepayments.

While we intend to use hedging to mitigate some of our interest rate risk, we do not intend to hedge all of our exposure to changes in interest rates and prepayment rates, as there are practical limitations on our ability to insulate our portfolio from all potential negative consequences associated with changes in short-term interest rates in a manner that will allow us to seek attractive net spreads on our portfolio.

In addition, a variety of other factors relating to our business may also impact our financial condition and operating performance. These factors include:

• our access to funding and borrowing capacity;

• our borrowing costs;

• our hedging activities;

• the market value of our agency securities; and

• the REIT requirements, the requirements to qualify for an exemption under the Investment Company Act and other regulatory and accounting policies related to our business.

Our manager is entitled to receive a management fee that is based on our equity (as defined in our management agreement), regardless of the performance of our portfolio. Accordingly, the payment of our management fee may not decline in the event of a decline in our profitability and may cause us to incur losses.

For a discussion of additional risks relating to our business see Item 1A-"Risk Factors".

Market and Interest Rate Trends and the Effect on our Portfolio

Credit Market Disruption

Since 2007, the residential housing and mortgage markets in the United States have experienced a variety of difficulties and challenging economic conditions including historically high loan defaults and credit losses, as well as decreased liquidity. Recently, the financial weakness of some of the European Union sovereign nations has renewed concerns of the stability of financial systems worldwide. Further increased volatility and deterioration in the overall financial markets may adversely affect the performance and market value of the agency securities in which we invest. In addition, we rely on the availability of financing to acquire agency securities on a leveraged basis. If market conditions deteriorate further, our lenders may exit the repurchase market, further tighten lending standards, or increase the amount of equity capital (or "haircut") required to obtain financing, any of which could make it more difficult or costly for us to obtain financing.

Developments at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Payments on the agency securities in which we invest are guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Because of the guarantee and the underwriting standards associated with mortgages underlying agency securities, agency securities historically have had high stability in value and have been considered to present low credit risk. In 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under the conservatorship of the U.S. government due to the significant weakness of their financial condition. The turmoil in the residential mortgage sector and concern over the future role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the time generally increased credit spreads and decreased price stability of agency securities. In response to the credit market disruption and the deteriorating financial condition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress and the U.S. Treasury undertook a series of actions in 2008 aimed at stabilizing the financial markets in general, and the mortgage market in particular. These actions include the large-scale buying of MBS, significant equity infusions into banks and aggressive monetary policy.

In February 2011, the U.S. Treasury along with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development released a report entitled "Reforming America's Housing Finance Market" to Congress outlining alternatives for reforming the U.S. housing system, specifically Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and transforming the government's involvement in the housing market. Other industry groups, such as the Mortgage Bankers Association and the National Association Home Builders, have also issued proposals outlining their views of the path for housing reform. It is unclear how future legislation may impact the

housing finance market and the investing environment for agency securities, as the method of reform is undecided and has not yet been defined by the regulators. Without government support for residential mortgages, we may not be able to execute our current business model in an efficient manner.

On October 4, 2012, the Federal Housing Finance Authority (the "FHFA") released its white paper entitled "Building a New Infrastructure for the Secondary Mortgage Market" (the "FHFA White Paper"). This release follows up on the FHFA's February 21, 2012 Strategic Plan for Enterprise Conservatorships, which set forth three goals for the next phase of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conservatorships. These three goals are to (i) build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market, (ii) gradually contract Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations, and (iii) maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages.

The FHFA White Paper proposes a new infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has two basic goals. The first goal is to replace the current, outdated infrastructures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with a common, more efficient infrastructure that aligns the standards and practices of the two entities, beginning with core functions performed by both entities such as issuance, master servicing, bond administration, collateral management and data integration. The second goal is to establish an operating framework for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that is consistent with the progress of housing finance reform and encourages and accommodates the increased participation of private capital in assuming credit risk associated with the secondary mortgage market. The FHFA recognizes that there are a number of impediments to their goals which may or may not be surmountable, such as the absence of any significant secondary mortgage market mechanisms beyond Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, and that their proposals are in the formative stages. As a result, it is unclear if the proposals will be enacted. If such proposals are enacted, it is unclear how closely what is enacted will resemble the proposals from the FHFA White Paper or what the effects of the enactment will be.

U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities Market Intervention

One of the main factors impacting market prices has been the U.S. Federal Reserve's programs to purchase U.S. Treasury and agency securities in the open market. On September 21, 2011, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced "Operation Twist," which is a program by which it purchased, by the end of December 2012, more than $650 billion of U.S. Treasury securities with remaining maturities between six and 30 years and sold an equal amount of U.S. Treasury securities with remaining maturities of three years or less. In December 2012, in an effort to keep long-term interest rates at low levels, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced an expansion of its asset buying program starting in January 2013, at which time it would commence outright purchases of longer-term U.S. Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. This new U.S. Treasury securities purchase program replaces "Operation Twist," which expired in December 2012. On January 30, 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve affirmed its intention to continue this policy. By reducing the available supply of longer term U.S. Treasury securities in the market, these actions should put downward pressure on longer term interest rates, including rates on financial assets that investors consider to be close substitutes for longer term U.S. Treasury securities, like certain types of agency securities. The reduction in longer term interest rates, in turn, may contribute to a broad easing in financial market conditions that the U.S. Federal Reserve hopes will provide additional stimulus to support the economic recovery.

In September 2012, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced a third round of "quantitative easing" aimed to improve the employment outlook and increase growth in the U.S. economy. To accomplish this goal, it announced that it would purchase at least $40 billion of agency securities per month on an "open-ended" timeline, in addition to the reinvestment of the proceeds of principal repayments from its existing MBS holdings. Additionally, it pledged to keep short-term interest rates near zero for an extended period of time, currently estimated by the U.S. Federal Reserve to be at least mid-2015.

These programs have had many effects on our assets. One effect of these purchases has been an increase in the prices of agency securities, which has contributed to the decrease of our net interest margin. The unpredictability of these programs has also injected additional volatility into the pricing and

availability of our assets. It is difficult to quantify the impact, as there are many factors at work at the same time which affects the price of our securities and, therefore, our yield and book value. Due to the unpredictability in the markets for our securities in particular and yield generating assets in general, there is no pattern that can be implied with any certainty. We believe the largest risk is that if the government decides to sell significant portions of its portfolio, then we may see meaningful price declines.

U.S. Government Credit Rating

The U.S. debt ceiling and budget deficit concerns in mid-2011 led to the downgrade by Standard & Poor's of the U.S. government's credit rating for the first time in history. Assets backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered to have the credit of the U.S. government, and thus were also downgraded at that time. While the other rating agencies have not downgraded the U.S. government's rating, if they were to do so it would likely impact the perceived credit risk associated with agency securities and, therefore, decrease the value of the agency securities in our portfolio. In addition, further downgrades of the U.S. government's credit rating or the credit ratings of certain European countries would likely create broader financial turmoil and uncertainty, which could have a serious negative impact on the global banking system. This could have an adverse impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Regulatory Concerns

We believe that we conduct our business in a manner that allows us to avoid being regulated as an investment company under the Investment Company Act pursuant to the exemption provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) for entities that are primarily engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring "mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate." On August 31, 2011, the SEC issued a concept release (No. IC-29778; File No. SW7-34-11, Companies Engaged in the Business of Acquiring Mortgages and Mortgage-Related Instruments) pursuant to which it is reviewing whether certain companies that invest in MBS and rely on the exemption from registration under Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the Investment Company Act (such as us) should continue to be allowed to rely on such exemption from registration. If we fail to continue to qualify for this exemption from registration as an investment company, or the SEC determines that companies that invest in MBS are no longer able to rely on this exemption, our ability to use leverage would be substantially reduced and we would be unable to conduct our business as planned, or we may be required to register as an investment company under the Investment Company Act, either of which could negatively affect the value of shares of our common stock and our ability to make distributions to our shareholders.

Certain programs initiated by the U.S. Government, through the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), to provide homeowners with assistance in avoiding residential mortgage loan foreclosures are currently in effect. The programs may involve, among other things, the modification of mortgage loans to reduce the principal amount of the loans or the rate of interest payable on the loans, or to extend the payment terms of the loans. While the effect of these programs has not been as extensive as originally expected, the effect of such programs for holders of agency securities could be that such holders would experience changes in the anticipated yields of their agency securities due to (i) increased prepayment rates and (ii) lower interest and principal payments.

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act") into law. The Dodd-Frank Act is extensive, complicated and comprehensive legislation that impacts practically all aspects of banking, and a significant overhaul of many aspects of the regulation of the financial services industry. Although many provisions remain subject to further rulemaking, the Dodd-Frank Act implements numerous and far-reaching changes that affect financial companies, including our company, and other banks and institutions which are important to our business model. Certain notable rules are, among other things:

• requiring regulation and oversight of large, systemically important financial institutions by establishing an interagency council on systemic risk and implementation of heightened prudential standards and regulation by the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve for systemically important financial institutions (including nonbank financial companies), as well as the implementation of the FDIC resolution procedures for liquidation of large financial companies to avoid market disruption;

• limiting the U.S. Federal Reserve's emergency authority to lend to nondepository institutions to facilities with broad-based eligibility, and authorizing the FDIC to establish an emergency financial stabilization fund for solvent depository institutions and their holding companies, subject to the approval of Congress, the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Federal Reserve;

• creating regimes for regulation of over-the-counter derivatives and non-admitted property and casualty insurers and reinsurers;

• implementing regulation of hedge fund and private equity advisers by requiring such advisers to register with the SEC;

• providing for the implementation of corporate governance provisions for all public companies concerning proxy access and executive compensation; and

• reforming regulation of credit rating agencies.

Many of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, including certain provisions described above are subject to further study, rulemaking, and the discretion of regulatory bodies. As the hundreds of regulations called for by the Dodd-Frank Act are promulgated, we will continue to evaluate the impact of any such regulations. It is unclear how this legislation may impact the borrowing environment, investing environment for agency securities and interest rate swaps as much of the bill's implementation has not yet been defined by the regulators.

In addition, in 2010, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervisors of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee, published its "calibrated" capital standards for major banking institutions ("Basel III"). Under these standards, when fully phased in on January 1, 2019, banking institutions will be required to maintain heightened Tier 1 common equity, Tier 1 capital and total capital ratios, as well as maintaining a "capital conservation buffer." Beginning with the Tier 1 common equity and Tier 1 capital ratio requirements, Basel III will be phased in incrementally between January 1, 2013 and January 1, 2019. The final package of Basel III reforms were approved by the G20 leaders in November 2010 and are subject to individual adoption by member nations, including the United States by January 1, 2013. It is unclear how the adoption of Basel III will affect our business at this time.

In September 2011, the Administration announced it was working on a major plan to allow certain homeowners who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth to refinance. In October 2011, the FHFA announced changes to HARP to expand access to refinancing for qualified individuals and families whose homes have lost value, including increasing the HARP loan-to-value ratio above 125%. However, this would only apply to mortgages guaranteed by the U.S. government-sponsored entities. In addition, the expansion does not change the time period which these loans were originated, maintaining the requirement that the loans must have been guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac prior to June 2009. There are many challenging issues to this proposal, notably the question as to whether a loan with a loan-to-value ratio of 125% qualifies as a mortgage or an unsecured consumer loan. The chances of this initiative's success have created additional uncertainty in the agency securities market, particularly with respect to possible increases in prepayment rates. We do not expect this announcement to have a significant impact on our results of operations.

On January 4, 2012, the U.S. Federal Reserve released a report titled "The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations" to Congress providing a framework for thinking about certain issues and tradeoffs that policy makers might consider. It is unclear how future legislation may impact the housing finance market and the investing environment for agency securities as the method of reform is undecided and has not yet been defined by the regulators.

Exposure to European Financial Counterparties

We have no direct exposure to any European sovereign credit. We do finance the acquisition of our agency securities with repurchase agreements, some of which are provided by European banks. In connection with these financing arrangements, we pledge our securities as collateral to secure the borrowing. The amount of collateral pledged will typically exceed the amount of the financing with the extent of over-collateralization ranging from 3%-6% of the amount borrowed. While repurchase agreement financing results in us recording a liability to the counterparty in our consolidated balance sheet, we are exposed to the counterparty, if during the term of the repurchase agreement financing, a lender should default on its obligation and we are not able to recover our pledged assets. The amount of this exposure is the difference between the amount loaned to us plus interest due to the counterparty and the fair value of the collateral pledged by us to the lender including accrued interest receivable on such collateral.

In addition, we use interest rate swaps to manage interest rate risk exposure in connection with our repurchase agreement financings. We will make cash payments or pledge securities as collateral as part of a margin arrangement in connection with interest rate swaps that are in an unrealized loss position. In the event that a counterparty were to default on its obligation, we would be exposed to a loss to a swap counterparty to the extent that the amount of cash or securities pledged exceeded the unrealized loss on the associated swaps and we were not able to recover the excess collateral.

During the past several years, several large European banks have experienced financial difficulty and have been either rescued by government assistance or by other large European banks. Some of these banks have U.S. banking subsidiaries, which have provided financing to us, particularly repurchase agreement financing for the acquisition of agency securities. At December 31, 2012, we had entered into repurchase agreements and/or interest rate swaps with seven financial . . .