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| FRPT > SEC Filings for FRPT > Form 8-K/A on 12-Jun-2009 | All Recent SEC Filings |
12-Jun-2009
Change in Directors or Principal Officers
On April 13, 2009, the Compensation Committee of Force Protection, Inc. (the "Company") adopted the 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan for performance during 2009 (the "2009 Short-Term Incentive Program"). All executive officers of the Company, including the Company's named executive officers as defined by Item 402 of Regulation S-K, are eligible to earn a bonus payment under the 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan. In addition, the Compensation Committee authorized the Company's Chief Executive Officer to determine other employees' eligibility to participate (excluding the executive officers), and their respective payout ranges and metrics within certain guidelines.
Each executive officer's target opportunity to receive a payment under the 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plain is set as a percentage of the executive officer's base salary determined by taking into account the participant's authority level within the Company and median-to-market benchmarks. For 2009, the target opportunity for the executive officers, other than the Chief Executive Officer, has been set at 50% of his or her base salary. The target opportunity for the Company's Chief Executive has been set at 75% of his base salary.
Performance under the 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan is based on the following metrics and relative weightings: (i) Earnings Per Share, 25%; (ii) Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities, 25%; and (iii) New Orders, 50%. Performance sufficient for a 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan payment is determined by a range of performance achieved for each metric as established by the Compensation Committee. The table below sets forth the ranges for each metric.
Performance Range
Metric Threshold Target Maximum
Earnings Per Share 75 % 100 % 125 %
Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities 75 % 100 % 125 %
New Orders 75 % 100 % 125 %
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To determine the actual percentage payout, the actual performance for each metric is compared to the performance range (75% to 125% of the performance target) for each metric. If the actual performance is less than the performance threshold, there is no payout for that metric. If the actual performance is greater than the performance threshold, but less than the performance target, the payout shall be determined on a linear basis from 50% up to 100%, or the target payment. If the actual performance is greater than the performance target and less than or equal to the performance maximum, the payout shall be determined on a linear basis between the performance target up to 150%, or the maximum payout. As a result, the Company's executive officers, including the Chief Executive Officer, may be eligible to receive a payment equal to up to 150% of the target opportunity, if actual performance is greater than the performance target.
Eligible Base Salary Percentage Payout
Metric Threshold Target Maximum
EPS 50 % 100 % 150 %
Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities 50 % 100 % 150 %
New Orders 50 % 100 % 150 %
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In order to be eligible to receive any payment under the 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan, the participant must be employed by the Company at the time the award is made. Any 2009 Short-Term Incentive Plan award shall be determined and paid by March 15, 2010.
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